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‘Civil society’ may be defined as “the set of intermediate associations which are neither 
the state nor the family.”1 These include more-or-less formally organised religious and 
cultural networks (traditional and modern), and community and social welfare groups, as 
well as more overtly political organisations. However, political parties and other 
organisations seeking to assume state power are not part of civil society.2 The term may 
though, include some types of business support organisation, although it is normally 
restricted to the non-profit sector.3   
 
According to de Tocqueville and others (especially American theorists), the existence of 
civil society is central to democracy. These forms of association act as a check on both 
state power and undue private influence, encouraging the participation of social groups 
in political processes (understood in the widest sense). According to David Steinberg, 
“the significance of the term… lies in the hypothesis that if civil society is strong … then 
this … somehow translate(s) into overall trust in the political process of democracy or 
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democratization and leads to the diffusion of the centralized power of the state. Civil 
society is thus seen as an essential element of political pluralism.”4  
 
In her influential essay, Bringing The State Back In, Theda Skocpol outlines a 
Tocquevillian concept of state-society relations: “the organisational configuration (of 
states) ... affect political culture, encourage some kinds of group formation (but not 
others), and make possible the raising of certain political issues (but not others).”5 
According to Skocpol, the forms of association adopted by social groups (‘civil society’) 
are conditioned by the structures and strength of the state. 
 
We should therefore expect that changes in state structure, whether gradual or 
revolutionary, will result in the emergence of new forms of social identity and 
organisation (whether more or less ‘progressive’). This chapter will examine the manner 
in which Burmese political culture and concepts, particularly in the field of ethnicity, 
have been influenced by the development of the state. It will also examine the 
emergence of new forms of (post-ceasefire) state-society relationship, and what affect 
these might have on political culture in ethnic minority areas. 
 
However, social groups’ relationship with the state is not passive. Although the manner 
in which agents of political change conceive of their task may be determined by - or in 
reaction to - existing configurations of the state, social and economic groupings may 
nevertheless influence, and precipitate the transformation of, state structures. This 
chapter will examine the extent to which the re-emergence of civil society networks in 
ethnic minority areas might contribute towards processes of political transition in Burma. 
 
Discussions of social identity and organization in Burma have tended to focus on the 
topic of ethnicity. Is this complex phenomenon a product of historical state formation, or 
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does it have an independent existence? Conversely, how have concepts of ethnicity 
affected forms of social and political organisation, and with what consequences?  
 
The Historical Development of Ethnic Identities in Burma 
The Precolonial Era. In The Ethnic Origin of Nations, Anthony Smith asks whether state 
structures determine ethnicity. He reviews Anderson and Gellners’ accounts of the 
development of nationalism, and the related concept of ethnic identity, within the context 
of an emerging modern bureaucratic capitalism. Both share “a belief in the contingency 
of nationalism and the modernity of the nation.... Yet there are also difficulties with this 
view. For we find in pre-modern eras, even in the ancient world, striking parallels to the 
‘modern’ idea of national identity and character.”6 Smith demonstrates that many 
contemporary nations and nationalist movements are closely related to - if not actually 
derived from - ‘primordial’ ethnie. Nevertheless, the forms in which ethnicity is 
expressed and mobilised are subject to particular historical (‘situational’) processes. 
Such developments are illustrated by the case of the Mon. 
 
The one million-plus Mon-speaking people today living in Burma and neighbouring 
Thailand constitute an ‘ethnic minority’. However, this has not always been the case. 
From early in the first millennium, for a period of more than a thousand years, Mon and 
Khmer kings ruled over much of mainland Southeast Asia. Across northern and central 
Thailand until six or seven hundred years ago, and in central and lower Burma for 
another three hundred years, the bulk of the population were ethnic Mons. The classical 
period of Mon history came to an end in 1757, when the great Burman warrior-king 
Alaungphaya defeated the last Mon ruler of Pegu. Thousands of his followers were 
driven into exile in Ayuthaiya (Thailand), where they settled in the border areas 
adjoining Burma. At times over the two-and-a-half centuries since the fall of Pegu, it has 
been supposed that Mon was a dying language and the people in the twilight of their 
history. The Mons’ very success has threatened to be their undoing. 
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Mon civilisation was among the most influential in precolonial Southeast Asia. 
Significant aspects of the language, art and architecture, political and legal 
arrangements, and above all the religion of the great Thai and Burman civilisations were 
derived from the earlier Mon society, which acted as a vector in the transmission of 
Theravada Buddhism and Indianised political culture to the region. This civilising role 
helps to explain the enduring prestige attached to the Mon heritage across mainland 
Southeast Asia.  
 
Mon nationalists have looked back to the classical era as a golden age - a source of 
inspiration and legitimacy. They have struggled to defend the historical Mon identity 
from assimilation into that of the Burman and Thai majorities. 
 
However, ethnicity was only one factor among several in determining identity in pre-
modern Southeast Asia. Victor Lieberman states that the ‘Mon’ kingdoms of lower 
Burma were in fact expressions of something more complex, and that "the correlation 
between cultural, i.e. ethnic, identity and political loyalty was necessarily very imperfect, 
because groups enjoying the same language and culture were fragmented by regional 
ties."7 He argues that religion, culture, region and position in the tributary-status 
hierarchy all helped to determine personal, group and regime identity in precolonial 
times. As authority was vested in the person of the monarch, it was he8, rather than any 
abstract idea of ethnic community, that commanded primary loyalty. A Burman king 
could act as the patron of Mon princely clients, and vice-versa. 
 
Lieberman concedes, however, that the edicts of the king Alaungphaya made a clear 
ethnic distinction between his own (Burman) followers and those of the "Talaing (Mon) 
renegades."9 Indeed, ethnic polarisation accelerated rapidly under Alaungphaya, who 
played the ‘race card’ to his advantage.10  
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Certainly, Mon and Burman identities were already well-established before the arrival in 
Southeast Asia of the first Europeans, and since no later than the mid-eighteenth 
century, individuals and communities have represented themselves as either 'Mon' or 
'Burman', depending on the political situation. Kings and modern politicians have used 
such ethnic labels to create and control power bases, which since the colonial period 
have tended to become ossified as ethnic communities.11  
 
The Colonial Era. Before the British annexation of Burma, the Mon had already become 
a subject people. Their ancient culture and language persisted, but the era of Mon 
political dominion was at an end. Although the advent of British rule was to remove the 
immediate fact of Burman domination, this was replaced by another, in many ways 
more insidious regime, under which Burmese demographics underwent a significant 
shift. 
 
Following the first two Anglo-Burmese wars (1824-26 and 1852), large numbers of 
ethnic Burmans moved south into lower Burma, taking advantage of new opportunities 
in agriculture and business. The Mon and other minority groups also changed their 
patterns of residence, livelihood and education. Indeed, so great was the erosion of 
Mon culture and language under the British that, by the time the colonialists finally 
departed, there were very few Mon speakers still living in the Irrawaddy Delta or Pegu, 
the ancient Mon homelands. According to the last colonial census, by 1931 all but three 
per cent of the Mon population of Burma was confined to Amherst District, in what is 
today central Mon State.12 
 
The previous 1921 census had recorded 324,000 Mons "by race", but only 189,000 
"speakers of Mon."13 The descendants of these non-Mon speakers would today be 
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classified as ethnic Burmans - i.e. as Burmese speaking citizens of a relatively new 
entity: the state of Burma. 
 
In 1886, following the Third Anglo-Burmese War, Burma was fully incorporated into the 
Empire, as a province of British India. The British divided the colony into the central 
lowlands of ‘Burma Proper’ (where the great majority of Mon speakers lived) and a 
horseshoe of ethnic minority-populated ‘Frontier Areas’, on the periphery of the state. In 
the former, the British governed by direct rule, thereby ensuring the destruction of the 
traditional Burmese polity. In the Frontier Areas, they followed the more common British 
colonial model of indirect rule (also adopted by the French in Laos and Cambodia), 
governing via local potentates. Crucially, the two zones were never integrated 
administratively. This tended to reduce the scope of those ‘colonial pilgrimages’ which 
might have fostered a stronger sense of pan-Burmese identity among the colonised, at 
least within elite circles.14 Unlike the diverse peoples of Indonesia (all of whom were 
ruled by the Dutch from Java, thus helping to forge the idea of a unified Indonesian 
nation) - but like those in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos - the separate identities of 
Bama and non-Burmans were reinforced by the colonial experience. 
 
Notwithstanding the lack of colonial administrative integration, the adoption of Burmese 
as the language of state helped to accelerate processes of assimilation. As noted 
above, over the course of the nineteenth century, large numbers of Mon speakers came 
to adopt the Burmese language, and associated forms of political culture.15 Although the 
colonial authorities instigated optional civil service examinations in Mon, and between 
1937-42 funded a Mon literacy and population survey, the British administration 
generally treated the ancient Mon culture and history with benign neglect. The bulk of 
official attention focused on potentially restive ‘hilltribes’, such as the Karen and Kachin, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
177,939 “mixed” Mon-Burmans. Thus over a period of forty years, while the population of Burma 
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of fears associated with being identified as Mon. 
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 On integrative/ exclusive patterns of nation-building in Indonesia and Vietnam, see Anderson (1991), 
pp. 114-19. 
 7 
who were more amenable to the colonialists’ self-imposed civilising mission.16 
Nevertheless, Mon elites were able to assert themselves through the patronage of 
religious works: Mon language schools were established by monks, and by 1847 the 
Baptists were publishing Mon tracts in Moulmein. Later, a Mon Buddhist press was set 
up on Bilu Kyun Island, and the Hanthawaddy Press was established in Rangoon, which 
printed Mon language history texts, as well as a regular journal.17 
 
The British introduced capitalist economic measures, which over time led to a degree of 
social mobility and the breakdown of traditional bonds. This “rationalisation of the state” 
involved the replacement of patron-client relations with an administration based on 
modern, objective definitions of the role of state agents.18 As an indirect result of the 
realignment of traditional power structures, increasingly large numbers of people 
ceased to identify with a particular region or ethnicity, but came to regard themselves as 
‘Burmese’ - i.e. as citizens of a new entity: the colony (and potential state) of Burma.  
 
Thant Myint-U has described how the British empire's extended assault on the 
peripheries of the once poly-ethnic Konbaung empire reduced the latter to an ethnic 
Burman, "relatively homogenous core which … made easier a stronger sense of local 
patriotism."19 The traditional social, economic and political structures of Upper Burma 
were overthrown, and replaced by an administration geared to the needs of British 
India. (Although the sangha did survive the colonial period, its traditional educational 
role and close identity with the state were both undermined.) Thus, members of the 
Burman majority found themselves marginalised within the colonial state, with little 
reason to identify with its ethos or structures, but considerable reason to resent those 
who did. Colonial state policy resulted in the creation of a large pool of disenfranchised 
and disaffected people, available for mobilization by educated elites. 
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Meanwhile, the colonial authorities attempted to establish a “level playing field” among 
the various ethnic peoples of Burma.20 They were quite successful in ensuring equality 
of opportunity for different groups in the country, and large numbers of minority people 
received an education, and went on to types of employment, that would not have been 
open to their ancestors. The British thus fostered the emergence of self-consciously 
distinct ‘ethnic minority’ groups, who were encouraged to identify themselves in 
opposition to the Burman majority. Second and third generation elites from within these 
‘imagined communities’ went on to lead Burma’s ethnic nationalist movements in the 
turbulent years directly preceding and following the Japanese invasion of 1941.21 
 
The Second World War and Since. Unlike the hill Karen, the Mon did not play a 
significant role in assisting British officers operating behind enemy lines in Burma during 
the war. However, large numbers did join the Burma Independence Army (BIA), and a 
Mon Youth Organisation (MYO) was formed in 1941, several members of which later 
fought with the BIA against the departing Japanese forces.22 
 
The wartime regime in Burma outlawed the teaching of minority languages, espousing a 
quasi-National Socialist ideology of "one voice, one blood, one nation."23 Although, by 
late 1945, Dr Ba Maw' administration had been thoroughly discredited, non-Burman 
groups were alarmed by the racial chauvinism inherent in the wartime government's 
pronouncements. As Taylor observes, by the end of the war, "ethnicity, religion or 
Communism inspired more loyalty than did the state."24 
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Within a year of independence, Arakanese, Karen, Mon and other ethnic nationalists 
had take up arms against the state, as had the powerful Communist Party of Burma. 
Over the following decade-and-a-half, several more groups were to join the 
insurrections; many articulated some kind of ethnic nationalist agenda. 
 
In this militarised context of rebellion and counter-insurgency, the Tatmadaw moved to 
capture the state, in order to defend a particular idea of the nation, the origins of which 
lie in the colonial era and the Second World War. This conflation of state and nation - in 
the form of a politicised army - has profoundly influenced the development of Burmese 
political culture.25 Despite ostensible changes in ideology and political programme, the 
key concept of an independent nation (identified with the Burman cultural centre) and 
strong state, with the capacity to shape state-society relations, has remained a 
constant, with the Tatmadaw regarding itself as the principal agent of implementing 
policy upon - and defending the state from - the complexities of Burmese society.  
 
Mary Callahan demonstrates how the army developed and projected the idea of an 
independent Burma, centred on a highly politicised Tatmadaw, dominated by ethnic 
Burman officers.26 These veterans of the chaotic war years were influenced by 
memories of the divisive colonial regime, and were determined to prevent the 
disintegration of the union. When the Tatmadaw assumed state power, its leaders 
identified the interests of this - the most ‘patriotic’ institution in Burma - with those of the 
state. The young officers who assumed control, first of the Tatmadaw and then of state, 
had been exposed to competing versions of what an army might be, and how it might 
relate to the state and wider society (as had the leaders of various ethnic nationalist and 
communist armed groups opposed to them).27 
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The Suppression of Burmese Civil Society 
1958-1988. According to Callahan, having experienced the ultimate authority of military 
over civilian administration under both the British and Japanese, in the 1950s leaders of 
both the Tatmadaw and civilian government began “institutionalising the primacy of 
coercion in state-society relations.”28 At an October 1958 Tatmadaw conference (held 
following the first Ne Win coup), the Psychological Warfare Directorate distributed a 
detailed critique of civilian-constitutional politics. This document attacked the citizen’s 
right “to express his views and desires upon all subjects in whatever way he wishes.”29 
A blue-print for later military pronouncements, it proposed replacing the 1947 
constitution with one written by those “who have more specialised knowledge”, rather 
than “unscrupulous politicians and deceitful Communist rebels and their allies” 
(including recently surrendered Mon and other ex-insurgents: see below). Callahan 
claims that “the significance of this paper cannot be overstated... the constitution was no 
longer sacred.”30 It laid the basis for the suppression of Burmese civil society in the 
1960s. 
 
As the state extended its control over previously autonomous aspects of social life, civil 
society networks - which were not yet well-established - could no longer operate 
independently. Meanwhile, opposition to the regime was either eliminated, driven 
underground, or forced into open revolt. After 1962-63, the existence of renewed armed 
opposition to the military government provided a pretext for the further extension of 
state control, and suppression of diverse social groups deemed antipathetic to the 
modernizing state-socialist project. The Ne Win regime’s suppression of non-Burman 
cultural and political identities, epitomised by the banning of minority languages from 
state schools, drove a new wave of disaffected ethnic minority citizens into rebellion.31 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
former colonial masters, or are they able to create models based on their own cultural imaginations and 
their own genuine practices?”: Gravers, in Tonnesson and Antlov (1996), p. 242. 
28
 Callahan (1996), p. 128. 
29
 Quoted in Ibid. p. 478. 
30
 Ibid. p. 479. 
 11 
According to Steinberg, “civil society died under the BSPP; perhaps, more accurately, it 
was murdered.”32 Under the 1974 constitution, all political activity beyond the strict 
control of the state was outlawed.33 By 1980, even the previously independent sangah 
had been brought under at least partial state control.34 (Nevertheless, Burma’s 250,000 
monks and novices retained a prestige and influence which extended across all strata of 
society. Among the few institutions in Burma not directly controlled by the state, the 
sangah - and Christian churches - remained among the potentially most powerful 
sectors of civil society.) 
 
1988-2002. Since the early years of independence, control over state power has been 
contested by a variety of identity groups, while its structures have profoundly affected 
perceptions and modes of social organisation. Popular participation may be mobilised 
either for or against an authoritarian regime, and it seemed for a few weeks in the 
summer of 1988 that ‘people’s power’ might prevail in Burma, as it had two years 
previously in the Philippines. The failure of the 1988 ‘Democracy Uprising’ in Burma - 
like that of the May-June 1989 ‘Democracy Spring’ in China - was in large part due to 
the underdeveloped nature of civil society in these states.  
 
A lack of democratic culture prevented powerful gestures of political theatre from 
initiating sustained political change. Unlike those in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, in 
the Philippines in 1986, or in Thailand in 1992, the Burmese and Chinese democracy 
activists had little social space within which to operate, or to build upon the people’s 
evident desire for fundamental change. In particular, Burma and China had no 
counterpart to the Catholic Church or trades unions, which played important roles in the 
Polish and Filipino democracy movements.35 The BSPP regime had succeeded in 
denying social groups a foothold in mainstream politics or the economy, except under 
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strict state control. Potential opposition was thereby marginalised, and could emerge 
only in times of crisis and upheaval, presenting the military with a pretext to clamp-down 
on ‘anarchy’ and ‘chaos’ (thus the State Law and Order Restoration Council). 
 
Under the SLORC, state-society relations were further centralised. Particularly following 
the ascension of Senior General Than Shwe in 1992, social control was reinforced by 
the reformation of local militias and mass organisations, and the indoctrination of civil 
servants. The police, and even the Fire Brigade were brought under military control, and 
the SLORC established a number of government-controlled non-government 
organisations (GONGOs!). By 2002, the Union Solidarity and Development Association 
(USDA) - established in September 1993, along the lines of the pro-military GOLKAR 
party in Indonesia - had a membership of some 16,000,000 people, many of whom were 
reportedly pressurised into joining. Its objectives included upholding the regime’s ‘Three 
National Causes’ and the ‘promotion of national pride.’ Beyond this highly circumscribed 
sector, ‘civil society’ and the operation of independent political parties, such as the 
National League for Democracy (NLD), were severely restricted, as were freedoms of 
expression and association, and access to information and independent media. 
 
In May 1999 the Ministry of Information published a Declaration of  Defence Policy, 
which outlined the regime’s largely successful attempts to modernise and expand the 
Tatmadaw. In classic SLORC-style (influenced by the formulaic structure of traditional 
Buddhist doctrine), this document underlined the leadership role of the Tatmadaw, and 
outlined ‘Twelve Objectives’ and ‘Four Desires’ of state policy. These included 
opposition to “those relying on external elements, acting as stooges, holding negative 
views”, and “the preservation and safeguard of culture and national character.” The 
regime exhorted patriotic Burmese to “crush all destructive elements as the common 
enemy” (a motto emblazoned on bill-boards across the country in the 1990s).36 As 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
35
 Furthermore, capital markets and outside forces (e.g. US pressure) played more important roles in 
determining the course of events in the Philippines and Thailand than they did in isolated Burma and 
China, with their relatively ‘closed’ societies. 
36
 Quoted in Maung Aung Myoe (1999), p. 18. The ‘Three National Causes’ were announced as the basis 
of SLORC rule in September 1988: ibid. pp. 3-14. 
 13 
Andrew Selth noted the same year, “the armed forces now see themselves as 
embodying the state.” Clearly, the SLORC-SPDC did not accept the notion of a ‘loyal 
opposition'.37 
 
Nevertheless, one consequence of the ceasefire process (discussed in more detail 
below), and the partial ‘opening up’ of the Burmese economy in the early 1990s - in an 
attempt to attract more resources, and modify the military regime’s poor international 
image - has been the gradual re-emergence of civil society in parts of Burma. Since the 
early-mid 1990s, the NGO sector in particular has undergone a significant regeneration. 
It currently includes some forty international and more-or-less officially registered local 
agencies, as well as various Burmese religious, cultural, social, professional and 
educational associations. 
 
Among these are a number of organisations working in ethnic minority-populated areas, 
including both indigenous NGOs and some international agencies working through local 
staff. Although their access to the most needy rural populations (including internally 
displaced persons) is highly restricted, and the political aspects of their programmes are 
usually obscured by a humanitarian-welfare gloss, these pioneer NGOs have played an 
important role in the development of civil society networks, under the most difficult and 
repressive of conditions.38 In some cases, they have been assisted by enlightened state 
employees, who may work surreptitiously towards non-SPDC sanctioned ends. Such 
elements of the state sector may bridge the public-private gap; although civil society has 
been repressed in Burma, it can re-emerge in the most unlikely places.39 
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The Ethnic Dimension 
The distinction between ‘Burmese’ and ‘Burman’ nationalism has not always been clear; 
indeed, the former has often been subsumed under the latter. According to D.R. 
SarDesai, nationalism in Southeast Asia “has been in most cases a response to 
imperialism and the political and economic exploitation of the governed. In a certain 
sense, nationalist revolutions were the creation of Western colonial powers 
themselves."40 This has also been true of ethnic nationalism in Burma, vis-à-vis the 
Burman-dominated central government, which has been accused of practicing ‘internal 
colonialism’. 
 
Tatmadaw ideologues have viewed their task as one of ‘national salvation’: the army 
has sought to defend the unitary, socialist state, which emerged from the heroic struggle 
for independence. As the Tatmadaw assumed control of key institutions, it sought to 
impose a model of state-society relations, in which the (ethnic minority) periphery was 
dominated by a strong (Burman-orientated) centre. As pluralism was suppressed, it was 
replaced with a state-sponsored nationalism. The process of ‘Burmanisation’ saw 
diverse (and according to the military, divisive) minority cultures, histories and socio-
political aspirations subsumed under a homogenising ‘national’ identity, derived from the 
Burman historical tradition. 
 
On the subject of state building, Clifford Geertz has cautioned that communal 
‘primordialism’ (defined by reference to ‘blood ties’, race, language, region, religion and 
custom) threatens to overwhelm and fragment many third world countries, unless ethnic 
groups can be persuaded to integrate with the state, recognising its authority over 
certain key aspects of political life. However, in The Integrative Revolution he is alert to 
the possibility of a particular ethnic group coming to dominate the state. Indeed, Geertz 
cites Burma as an example, in which “peripheral groups ... are naturally inclined to see 
(the state) as alien ... vigorously assimilationist ... (and prone to a) ‘Burmanisation’ ... 
which traces back to the very beginnings of the nationalist movement.” He characterises 
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ethnic conflict in modern Burma as a struggle between “one central ... group and 
several ... opposed peripheral groups ... the Irrawaddy Valley Burmese versus the 
various hill tribes.”41  
 
Writing about Burma, David Brown describes a “situation where the state acts as the 
agency of the dominant ethnic community … in which recruitment to the state elite … 
and government is disproportionately and overwhelmingly from the majority ethnic 
group... The ethnocratic state is one which employs the cultural attributes and values of 
the dominant ethnic segment as the core elements for the elaboration of the national 
ideology …. and its political structures serve to maintain and reinforce the 
monopolization of power by the ethnic segment.”42 Similarly, Gustaaf Houtman calls 
Burma a ‘culture state’, where the military government is bent on consolidating the 
‘Myanmafication’ of culture and history, and suppressing Burma’s diverse social 
identities.43 In its appeal to a monolithic national identity, ‘Myanmafication’ displays 
aspects of fascist ideology. Furthermore, the emphasis on Burmese (read Burman) 
purity, and the denial of minority cultures, has led to a characteristically totalitarian re-
writing of history. 
 
In a rare public justification of such policies, shortly after seizing power in 1962, General 
Ne Win denied the need for a separate Mon culture and ethnicity. According to Ne Win 
(who apparently claimed to be of mixed Mon ancestry44), the Mon tradition had been 
fully incorporated into Burmese national culture, and thus required no distinct 
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expression. In August 1991 the then-SLORC Chairman, General Saw Maung, made a 
similar speech, in which he denied the need for a separate Mon identity.45 
 
The process of Burmanisation - or ‘Myanmafication’ - has been illustrated, since the 
early 1990s, by the construction of a series of museums across the country, which are 
intended to institutionalise and reproduce ‘Myanmar national culture.’46 A particularly 
striking example is the reconstruction of the Kambawzathadi Palace at Pegu, on the 
supposed site of the mid-sixteenth century capital of king, Tabinshwehti, and his 
successor, Bayinnaung. Since 1990, the royal apartments and audience hall have been 
excavated and rebuilt in concrete. As historians have little idea what the original palace 
looked like, the new buildings are modelled on nineteenth century palace designs from 
Mandalay. 
 
The Kambawzathadi Palace project received a major boost in September 1999, when it 
was visited by Lt.-General Khin Nyunt - an event which made the front page of The New 
Light of Myanmar.47 However, what the government-sponsored literature on 
Kambawzathadi mentions only in passing is that the new palace was in fact built upon 
the much older remains of the sixteenth century Mon capital of Pegu. In fact, parts of 
these largely un-excavated ruins are still visible as a series of grassy mounds and 
depressions, between the newly-‘rebuilt’ royal chambers and the foot of the great 
Shwemawdaw Pagoda (Mon: Kyaik Mawdaw). If properly examined, this archaeological 
site might yield important information regarding the historical development of mainland 
Southeast Asian polity and religion. As it is however, the neglected remains of 
Hongsawaddy are a symbolic reminder of the balance of power in modern Burma.48 
 
The Ethnic Nationalist Reaction 
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In the chaotic years between 1945 and independence, elites within the Mon community 
articulated claims to social and political autonomy, on the basis of ethnicity.49 As Mikael 
Gravers puts it, “identity thus becomes the foundation of political rights.” He calls this 
process “ethnicicism … the separation or seclusion of ethnic groups from nation states 
in the name of ethnic freedom … where cultural differences are classified as primordial 
and antagonistic.”50 
 
By 1950, two communist factions and a number of ethnic insurgent groups, including 
the Mon People’s Front (MPF), had taken up arms against the government and 
Tatmadaw, and established ‘liberated zones’, from where they hoped to achieve 
independence, or at least substantial autonomy from Rangoon (the communists of 
course, sought to overthrow the U Nu regime). Like several other insurgent 
organisations however, the MPF agreed a ceasefire with Rangoon 1958, and 
subsequently attempted to pursue its goals from with ‘the legal fold’. However, one 
young MPF cadre, Nai Shwe Kyin, together with a small group of followers, rejected the 
agreement and, the day after the MPF ‘surrender’, established the New Mon State Party 
(NMSP), which was to be in the vanguard of the armed struggle for Monland for the next 
forty years. According to its founder, the NMSP aimed “to establish an independent 
sovereign state unless the Burmese government is willing to permit a confederation of 
free nationalities exercising the full right of self-determination inclusive of right of 
secession."51 
 
Given the traditional importance of education in Mon Buddhist culture, and of language 
to ascriptions of ethnic identity, it is not surprising that the NMSP organised a school 
system, soon after re-establishing itself in the mid-1960s. The first of a newly 
reorganised system of Mon National Schools were opened in 1972-73, and by the mid-
1990s the NMSP was running a high school, several middle schools and nearly one 
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hundred primary schools.52 These offered Mon language teaching in all subjects at 
primary level, except for foreign languages (English and Burmese). However, due to a 
shortage of Mon-speaking teachers, middle school history was taught in Mon, with other 
subjects in Burmese, while the medium of high school instruction was usually 
Burmese.53 The Mon National Schools played an important role in the NMSP’s 
projection of a distinctly Mon national culture, underpinning the party’s secessionist - 
and later, federalist - policies. However, in purging the curriculum of the Burmanisation 
of history and culture, the Mon education system tended to overcompensate, and 
perhaps over-emphasise the glorious history of the Mon.54 
 
The Thailand-based Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HRFM), observes that the 
state and NMSP education systems’ objectives “are opposite. The government 
education system aims to implement government’s protracted assimilationist policy by 
pushing the non-Burman ethnic students to learn and speak Burmese.… The main 
objectives of the Mon education system are to preserve and promote Mon literature … 
Mon culture and history, to not forget the Mon identity.”55  
 
Somewhat ironically, the Tatmadaw has played a part in this affirmation of Mon identity. 
As Hobsbawm notes, “we know too little about what … goes on, in the minds of most 
relatively inarticulate men and women, to speak with any confidence about their 
thoughts and feelings towards the nationalities and nation-states which claim their 
loyalties.”56 The manner in which 'ordinary' Mon people have responded to the 
nationalist agenda is often unclear. The great majority are poor rice farmers, and day-to-
day survival is the prime consideration. Nevertheless, Mon villagers have routinely been 
persecuted because of their ethnicity, and as a result many have had little choice but to 
flee to insurgent-controlled territory. It is a truism of cultural studies that differentiation 
                                                           
52
 NMSP(15-12-94), p. 27. In December 1994 the party’s Fundamental Political Policy and Fundamental 
Constitution of Administration stated that the following were the “basic enemy of the Mons: colonialism, 
bureaucracy policy (capitalism), dictatorship, majority Burmanisation.” The NMSP constitution reflects 
longstanding commitments to both Mon national liberation and leftist political analysis. 
53




 The Mon Forum (August 1998). 
 19 
reinforces identity. Despite the government’s avowal that a separate Mon ethnic and 
national identity is redundant, its oppressive policies have ensured that - at least among 
the displaced populations along the border with Thailand - the notion of a distinct Mon 
identity lives on. If nothing else, the displacement and flight of villagers to border areas 
where they are dependant on the NMSP for basic security (and often food), is likely to 
have reinforced their public identification with Mon ethnicity.57 
 
Since the 1970s, many thousands of displaced Mon villagers have ‘voted with their feet’, 
seeking refuge in the insurgent-controlled ‘liberated zones’ (and later, refugee camps) 
along the Thailand-Burma border. However, state-society relations in the Mon and other 
‘liberated zones’ have tended to mirror those in ‘Burma proper’, in reaction against 
which the insurgents first took up arms.  
 
Joseph Silverstein argues that the political language and concepts of the Burmese 
opposition are at least partly derived from those of the military government.58 Similarly, 
in her study of Burmese political culture, Christina Fink notes that “the military’s 
propaganda and ways of operating have profoundly shaped even those opposed to 
military rule.”59 Like its military opponents, the NLD has often been intolerant of internal 
dissent. The importance of unity in Burmese political culture is no doubt a legacy of the 
liberation struggle, and the fractious early years of independence. Its centrality to 
Burmese politics attests to the degree to which the military, with its paranoia regarding 
foreign-sponsored disintegration of the union, has imposed its narratives of power on 
society. This observation recalls Skocpol’s analysis of the effects of state structures on 
social groups’ formation and political awareness, and is relevant also to the armed 
ethnic opposition.  
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Both sides in the civil war in Burma have long defined themselves in opposition to each 
other. For many insurgent groups, identity and the claim to legitimacy have come to 
reside in the act of rebellion itself. By the 1970s, the civil war had become 
institutionalised, and in many cases the revolutionaries began to resemble warlords. 
The political culture of the ‘liberated zones’ reflected the largely extractive nature of 
many insurgent groups’ relations to natural resources and the peasantry (their ethnic 
minority brethren, in whose name the revolution was being fought). Life in the ‘liberated 
zones’ thus became characterised by a top-down tributary political system, similar to 
that in government-controlled areas, aspects of which recalled pre-colonial forms of 
socio-political organisation.60 
 
Although (especially after 1988) most ethnic insurgent groups claimed to be fighting for 
‘democracy’, this ideal was not always reflected in their practices. Rebel leaders tended 
to discourage the expression of diverse opinions, and socio-political initiatives beyond 
the direct control of the militarised insurgent hierarchies were generally suppressed. 
One consequence was the endemic factionalism of Burmese opposition politics, with 
most groups unable to accommodate socio-political (or personality) differences among 
their members61; another was the suppression of pluralism in ethnic opposition circles, 
and the development of rigid political cultures in non-state controlled areas.  
 
Thus, aspects of resistance to the forces of assimilation themselves took on the 
characteristics of ‘cultural corporatism’. Ethnic minority opposition (in this case, Mon) 
civil society became prone to a homogenising concept of identity, which was in some 
respects profoundly undemocratic. The Mon and other ethnic nationalist movements 
had to contend with a contradiction between their message of democracy and national 
liberation, and a patriarchal tradition. The challenge - and opportunity - facing such 
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movements in the post-ceasefire era is how to combine the struggle for ethnic rights 
with an appreciation of democracy as a process, rather than a distant end state.62  
 
The NMSP leadership seems genuinely committed to a vision of a democratic 
Burma, based on respect for individual and group rights. However, the party has 
limited experience of fostering democratic practice in the areas and sectors 
under its control. The NMSP-SLORC ceasefire has at least created the military-
political ‘space’ within such efforts may be promoted.  
 
The Significance of the Ceasefires 
As a result of the series of ceasefires negotiated between the military government and 
insurgents since 1989, the security situation in much of rural Burma has improved 
significantly. However, villagers in many areas remain subject to a wide range of 
human and civil rights abuses, perpetrated by the Tatmadaw and - to a lesser extent - 
by various armed ethnic groups.  
 
Between 1995-2001, five small ex-NMSP splinter groups resumed armed conflict with 
the Tatmadaw (and sometimes with the NMSP also); in late 2001 another, militarily 
more significant anti-ceasefire Mon armed group emerged, and proceeded to 
undermine security across much of Mon State. However, by late 2003, the 
Hongsawatoi Restoration Party (HRP) had dwindled in support and capacity.  
 
Among other, more self-interested reasons, these Mon anti-ceasefire factions were 
motivated by complaints of continued Tatmadaw human rights abuses, and in particular, 
by a campaign of uncompensated land confiscation initiated in 2001.63 One predictable 
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consequence of the renewed instability in Mon State was the revival of the Tatmadaw’s 
notorious counter-insurgency policy.64 
 
The nature of the ceasefire process and ‘ceasefire groups’ in Burma are not uniform, 
although in nearly all cases the ex-insurgents have retained their arms, and still control 
sometimes extensive blocks territory. (However, the Mon ceasefire zone consists of little 
more than the Ye River watershed and a few isolated outposts further to the north.) In 
many quarters, the ceasefire agreements are regarded as little more than a cynical 
exercise in real politick, benefiting only vested interests in the military regime and 
insurgent hierarchies. However, to other observers and participants, they represent the 
best opportunity in decades to work towards the rehabilitation of deeply troubled ethnic 
minority-populated areas. For the NMSP and other ceasefire groups, the truces also 
represent opportunities to mobilise among their constituencies in government-
controlled areas - activities which were previously only possible on fear of arrest.   
 
The ceasefires are not peace treaties. These agreements generally lack all but the most 
rudimentary accommodation of the ex-insurgents’ political and developmental demands. 
Nevertheless, they have created some military and political ‘space’, within which 
community-level associational networks may re-emerge. Other factors behind the 
tentative revival of Burmese civil society over the past decade include the partial 
opening up of the economy in the early 1990s, and the cover and the limited support 
given by the international community. 
 
Many of Burma’s fledgling civil society networks are associated with progressive 
elements among the country’s International NGO community. This phenomenon reflects 
a trend among donors towards supporting local NGOs, which are considered to 
implement relief and development programmes more effectively than government 
departments. (Furthermore, in the case of Burma, many INGOs and UN agencies have 
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been reluctant to enter into partnership with the military-dominated state.) The presence 
of INGOs in Burma - especially in ethnic minority-populated areas - has to some extent, 
and in some places, helped to create an environment conducive to the development of 
local counterpart NGOs.65 
 
In the case of the Mon, several Thailand-based INGOs had previously supported 
projects in the NMSP ‘liberated zones’, including aid to the Mon refugees, the last of 
whom was repatriated by the Thai authorities in 1996.66 A few Thailand-based INGOs 
remain in contact with the party, and with local groups working under its umbrella. In 
general, these organisations have encouraged their Mon partners to retain an 
oppositionist stance vis-à-vis the Burmese military government. Since the 1995 
ceasefire, to which it agreed with considerable reluctance, there have been extensive 
debates within the NMSP - and the wider Mon nationalist community - regarding the 
wisdom of engaging with the SPDC and integrating the remaining NMSP-controlled 
zones with those controlled by the government.  
 
Until 2002-03, the party had generally been wary of pursuing contacts with the 
international community via Rangoon, choosing instead to distance itself from the 
SPDC, while continuing to receive limited cross-border  international support. However, 
in recent years the NMSP has taken tentative steps to engage more constructively 
with Rangoon-based international agencies.  
 
Nevertheless, since the ceasefire, the party’s women’s and education departments have 
succeeded in extending their activities beyond the NMSP-controlled zones, to Mon 
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communities across lower Burma. The Mon Women’s Organisation (MWO) has 
implemented community development, income generation, adult literacy and capacity 
development programs in a number of areas, and has developed a strategic partnership 
with the Metta Development Foundation. (Established in 1998, and one of the few 
legally registered local NGOs in Burma, Metta has projects in Shan, Karenni, Karen and 
Mon State, and in the Irrawaddy Delta). 
 
Meanwhile, despite some serious setbacks, during the 2003-04 school year the NMSP 
managed to run 187 Mon National Schools and 186 ‘mixed’ schools (buildings shared 
with the state system, where the use of minority languages is still banned). The Mon 
National Schools taught more than 50,000 pupils, approximately seventy per cent of 
whom lived in government-controlled areas, and would not previously have had access 
to an indigenous (Mon) language education. Illustrating an important aspect of the post-
ceasefire educational environment, a handful of graduates of the two Mon high schools 
have had the opportunity to continue their studies at state further education colleges. 
 
However, although the NMSP and other ceasefire groups have generally provided the 
political and military cover within which ethnic minority networks may develop, the key 
civil society payers have often not been the (ex-)insurgents. Those who have taken the 
lead in community initiatives over the past decade include members of semi-dormant 
religious and social welfare networks, as well as those who campaigned for ethnic 
minority parties in the May 1990 general election. In the case of the Mon, the latter 
include individuals associated with the Mon National Democratic Front (MNDF), which 
won five seats in the 1990 polls, but was outlawed in 1992.67 
 
A number of ethnic nationality social and welfare organisations - in particular, literature 
and culture promotion groups - were established well before the 1990s, but in recent 
years have become more active, and concerned with a wider range of issues. As in 
other parts of Burma, the re-emergence of such networks in Mon areas has been 
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particularly notable in the field of education. As the state school and higher education 
systems have continued to deteriorate, alternative models have emerged, such as the 
Mon sangah and Mon Literature and Culture Committee (MLCC)s’ Summer Mon 
Literature and Buddhist Teachings Training. 
 
A successor to the All Ramanya Mon Association (ARMA) and other cultural and youth 
groups of the 1930 and ‘40s, the MLCC pioneered Mon literacy training in the 1950s, 
seeking to expand and consolidate the Mon language skills, and thereby the cultural 
and historical awareness, of the Mon community in Burma. Although it was largely 
dormant during the repressive Ne Win era, monasteries across lower Burma continued 
to teach Mon throughout 1960s-80s and, since 1996, the MLCC has re-emerged as a 
leading player in this field, organising a series of successful Mon language and literacy 
training courses, taught by Mon educationalists and monks. Like the Karen and other 
Literature and Culture Committees, the MLCC is among the handful of specifically 
‘ethnic’ organisations tolerated by the military regime. It maintains branches in Rangoon 
and at Moulmein University, and in village monasteries across Mon State and in Pegu 
and Tenasserim Divisions.68 Supported by local donations and international funds, in 
2004 some 55,000 school students (70% of them girls) attended summer vacation 
courses in Mon language and culture-history, conducted in over one hundred 
monasteries and schools, in sixteen township across lower Burma. Most of these were 
situated in government-controlled areas. Although NMSP was limited to an indirect 
fund-raising role, this programme would not have been allowed by the regime before 
1995 ceasefire. 
 
However, patterns of development - and stagnation - among Burma’s ethnic minority 
communities are mixed. As Martin Smith has observed, the situation on the ground 
varies from district to district.69 While some aspects of the situation in Kachin State 
(exemplified by the formation of the Kachin Consultative Assembly in October 2002), 
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northern Shan State, and Mon and Karen States are quite encouraging, others are 
much less so. 
 
This fact is illustrated by an important anomaly: civil society networks may re-emerge 
among war-torn communities without insurgent groups associated with that population 
necessarily renouncing armed struggle. For example, the number of religious (Christian 
and Buddhist) and other Karen groups participating in community development activities 
has increased markedly over the past five years. These developments have occurred 
despite the on-going and chronic Karen insurgency (and intra-Karen factional fighting), 
and continued government restrictions on travel and organisation. However, the 
opposite is also true: not all ceasefires result in the emergence of functioning civil 
society networks. Those parts of Shan State controlled by the United Wa State Army 
(UWSA) since its 1989 ceasefire agreement with the SLORC are still characterised by a 
very circumscribed civil society. The UWSA’s ‘top-down’ command style, and 
associated distrust of autonomous community organisations, owes much to Burmese - 
and Wa - political culture, and to ideas of the ‘leading role of the party’ inherited from the 
Communist Party of Burma (of which the UWSA was an element until 1989). These 
factors are exacerbated by the limited social and economic opportunities in the Wa sub-
state, the minimal quantity and poor quality of education and health services, the 
degraded natural environment, and the pervasive corruption, political violence and 
‘warlordism’ associated with the booming drugs trade in the region.70 
 
The re-emergence of civil society networks in some parts of Burma raises a number of 
important issues. These are addressed at the levels of local, national and international 
analysis. 
 
Local Democracy. One consequence of Burma’s fifty year civil war has been the erosion 
of pluralism and democratic practices, in both non-state and (especially) state-controlled 
regions. Emergent civil society networks in ethnic minority areas, beyond the direct 
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control of either the militarised state or often authoritarian (ex-)insurgent groups, 
represent alternative forms of social and political organization, and opportunities for 
local democratisation (or at least, liberalisation). This type of ‘small d’ 
democratisation (or ‘democracy from below’) will be essential if any elite-led 
political transition in Burma is to be sustained, and positively effect the lives of 
people living in inaccessible, minority-populated border areas.  
 
It is possible that, by participating in such community development programmes, 
activists may be diverted into ‘safer’ and less challenging activities, thus depoliticising 
the struggle for ethnic rights in Burma. However, many of those involved in ‘above 
ground’ social networks - including members of the MNDF, an (outlawed) political party 
- are in fact still closely involved in politics. Implicitly, they are also challenging NMSP 
commissars for leadership of the Mon community, obliging the latter to re-assess their 
strategies, decision-making processes and policies. 
 
As a political party, the NMSP is not part of civil society. Could it - or the social welfare, 
youth and women’s departments under its control - be re-invented as a development 
agency? At present, having given up their largely symbolic armed opposition to 
Rangoon, the NMSP and other ceasefire groups are in danger of becoming 
marginalised within their own communities, unless they can re-invent themselves as 
post-ceasefire organisations. Such re-positioning must be accompanied by a re-
conceptualisation of political ideals and processes, reflected in the party’s policy and 
practice. The aging NMSP leaders have to determine where they stand on the big 
issues of Burmese politics. In particular, they must adopt a consistent policy towards the 
mainstream democracy movement (i.e. the NLD, but also the MNDF), and explain this 
position to constituencies inside Burma, in the border areas and overseas.  
 
The on-going realignment of Mon society in Burma is mirrored in developments over the 
past decade within opposition circles along the Thailand border. Mon exile groups 
across the border, and in the remaining ‘liberated zones’, tend to operate under the 
umbrella - but often beyond the direct control - of the NMSP. The democratisation and 
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increasingly sophisticated political analysis of such activist groups bodes well for the 
future.71 
 
Political Transition. A functioning civil society is a prerequisite of democratic transition. It 
is essential that groups and networks representative of Burma’s broad, plural society 
equip themselves to fill any power vacuum that may emerge, either as a result of radical 
shifts in national politics, or of a more gradual realignment, and accompanying 
withdrawal of the Tatmadaw from state power. The ability of Burma’s diverse social 
groups to re-assume control over aspects of their lives, which since the 1960s have 
been abrogated by the military, will depend on the strength of civil society. 
 
Although grass-roots mobilisation often takes place under the guise of ‘apolitical’, local 
self-help, welfare and community development activities, it nevertheless represents a 
challenge to the military regime’s authoritarian policies. The creation of locally-rooted 
associational networks undermines the ideological and practical basis of centralised 
military rule, creating spaces for the development of community autonomy, at least in 
limited spheres (e.g. language use). As Steinberg states in a recent article, the 
development of civil society in Burma “widens the space between the state and society, 
giving people greater freedom from government control. Such pluralism is an important 
base on which more responsive and responsible governments can be built.”72 
 
However, although it may be necessary to build democracy ‘from the base up’, the re-
emergence of civil society networks is not in itself sufficient to affect political transition. 
This will require a concerted, explicitly political act of will on behalf of Burmese 
politicians. Members of the predominantly urban-Burman political elite in Rangoon, 
represented  by the NLD, have proved that they are ready to take these risks, as have a 
number of ethnic leaders, who in July 2002 formed the United Nationalities Alliance 
(UNA), representing parties which participated in the 1990 elections (including the 
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MNDF).73 Recent developments indicate that the NMSP is also attempting to make its 
presence felt in the national political arena, although with limited success. 
 
International Responses. Post-ceasefire politics in Burma’s ethnic minority areas have 
generally been under-reported, in comparison with the ‘national level’ struggle between 
Daw Aung San Su Kyi’s NLD and the SPDC. The situation of a number of well-armed 
ceasefire groups in northern Burma has attracted some international attention, as many 
have been active in narcotics and amphetamines trafficking, the social effects of which 
are felt in Thailand and the west. However, the international community has been slow 
to recognise the significance of other ceasefire groups, such as the NMSP and the 
Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), which remain politically engaged - although 
their influence on events from ‘within the legal’ fold has been limited.  
 
Nevertheless, since the ceasefire, Mon nationalists - including those who never took up 
arms, or had long ago renounced armed conflict - have found some limited space and 
funds with which to work towards the re-emergence of civil society within their 
community. If the international community is serious in its desire to support political 
transition in Burma, it can play an important role in encouraging the development of 
such networks in ethnic minority areas.  
 
As Steinberg suggests, donors should “encourage local elements of civil society that 
can act as points for eventual political pluralism.”74 However, these groups’ capacity to 
absorb funds and implement effective projects is limited, and may remain so for some 
time. Therefore, donors wishing to help develop local civil society networks - and thus 
secure the fragile ceasefire process across much of rural Burma - must be prepared to 
commit to long-term partnerships, and to ensure that their interventions are made in 
consultation with local communities and their representatives.75 
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Changes in state structure have profoundly affected the historical formation and 
mobilisation of ethnic identities in Burma. Since 1962, the ‘ethnocratic state’ has 
suppressed non-Burman political identities and the operation of civil society, with 
profound consequences for the conceptualisation and expressions of ethnicity.   
 
The altered relationship between the central government (and Burmese military) and 
some minority groups (and ethnic insurgents), as a result of the ceasefire process, 
constitutes a significant realignment of state-society relations. As a result, new forms of 
social and political organisation have begun to emerge within the Mon and other 
minority communities, which have the potential to affect state structures, including those 
of the ‘liberated zones’. Whether the re-alignment of ethnic minority politics ultimately 
feeds back into the loop, and contributes towards transition at the national level, will 
depend on how politicians react to political opportunities - and attendant risks.  
 
Meanwhile, the NMSP is in danger of becoming marginalised, unless it can respond to 
the new environment with a new strategic vision. The ceasefire groups are uniquely 
positioned to take the lead in redefining the nature of civil-military relations in Burma. 
Ultimately, for both the Tatmadaw and the armed ethnic groups, the transition from 
insurgency to relative peace and stability - of which the present military regime is so 
proud - is less difficult than that from dictatorship to democracy. The first phase (peace-
making) is a prerequisite of the second phase (peace-building), but the latter addresses 
more fundamental issues. 
 
After decades of conflict, and amid on-going repression, opportunities exist for conflict 
resolution and political transition in Burma. To varying degrees, the SPDC, the NLD and 
ethnic minority leaders have all expressed their desire for peaceful social and political 
development. Although the scope and mechanics of any transition will be negotiated 
among elites, in order for recovery to be effective, members of the country’s diverse 
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social and ethnic groups must enjoy participation and a sense of ‘ownership’ in the 
process. Post-conflict transformation thus requires the rehabilitation of Burmese civil 
society. This difficult and uneven process is already underway, and is worthy of support.  
 
Foreign governments, UN agencies and INGOs should work to empower those non-
regime groups attempting to work inside Burma, under the most challenging 
circumstances. They should also continue to bring pressure on the SPDC to initiate 
political reform and enter into dialogue with representatives of Burma’s ethnic minority 
and opposition groups. 
 
Although the international community can play an important role in facilitating political 
transition, the success of this process will depend on the Burmese state and social 
groups. Based on a reading of British and French history, Skocpol suggests that “states 
not only conduct decision-making, coercive, and adjudicative activities in different ways, 
but also give rise to various conceptions of the meaning and methods of ‘politics’ itself, 
conceptions that influence the behaviour of all groups and classes in national 
societies.”76 The field of political culture - attitudes to and valuations of power and 
politics - is often stubbornly resistant to change. As Alan Smith and Khin Maung Win 
observe, the absence of consensus and “accumulated distrust and unwillingness to 
compromise between and centre- and Burman-dominated state … and non-Burman 
ethnic groups” is the most serious obstacle to political transition.77  
 
In a recent report for the Minority Rights Group, Martin Smith concludes that “conflict 
resolution, demilitarization and the building of civil society will be vital bridges in 
achieving reconciliation in the country and supporting the creation of conditions in which 
democracy can take root and minority rights be enjoyed.”78 However, as he - and many 
ethnic minority leaders - recognise, if it is to be sustained, peace and reconciliation must 
be accompanied by a just settlement of state-society issues. 
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 Skocpol (1985), p. 22.  
77
 Khin Maung Win and Alan Smith, in Sachsenroder and Frings (1998), p.132. 
78









Anderson, Benedict - ‘Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism’ (Verso 1991; revised edition) 
 
Aung-Thwin, Michael - ‘Myth and History in the Historiography of Early Burma: Paradigms, 
Primary Sources, and Prejudices’  (Ohio University Centre for International Studies 1998) 
 
Burma Centre Netherlands and Transnational Institute (eds) - ‘Strengthening Civil Society: 
Possibilities and Dilemmas for International NGOs’ (Silkworm Books 1999) 
 
Brown, David - ‘The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia’ (RoutledgeCurzon 1994) 
 
Calhoun, Craig - ‘Neither Gods Nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for Democracy in 
China’ (1994) 
 
Callahan, Mary - ‘The Origins of Military Rule in Burma’ (Cornell University, PhD Thesis 1996) 
 
Evans, P., Rueschemeyer, D. and Skocpol, T. (eds) - ‘Bringing the State Back In’ (Cambridge 
University Press 1985) 
 
Fink, Christina - ‘Living Silence: Burma Under Military Rule’ (Zed Books 2001) 
 
Furnivall, John - ‘The Fashioning of Leviathan: The Beginnings of British Rule in Burma’ 
(Journal of the Burma Research Society Vol. XXIX, II 1939; reprinted Occasional Paper, 
Department of Anthropology, Australian National University 1991) 
 
Geertz, Clifford - ‘The Integrative Revolution’, in Geertz (ed.) ‘Old Societies and New States: 
The Quest For Modernity in Asia and Africa’ (The Free Press 1963) 
 
Gravers, Mikael - ‘Nationalism as Political Paranoia in Burma: An Essay on the Historical 
Practice of Power’ (NIAS/ Curzon 1999) 
 
Guillon, Emmanuel - ‘The Mons: A Civilisation in Southeast Asia’ (The Siam Society 1999) 
  
Hobsbawm, Eric - ‘Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality’ (Cambridge 
University Press 1990; second edition) 
 
Houtman, Gustaaf - ‘Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics: Aung San Suu Kyi and the 
National League For Democracy’ (Monograph 33, Institute for the Study of Languages and 
Cultures of Asia and Africa Tokyo University of Foreign Studies 1999) 
 
Human Rights Foundation of Monland - The Mon Forum (monthly newsletter) 
 
International Crisis Group - ‘Burma/ Myanmar: How Strong is the Military Regime?’ (ICG Asia 
Report 11; December 2000) 
 




Lieberman, Victor - 'Ethnic Politics in Nineteenth Century Burma' (Modern Asian Studies Vol. 
12/3, pp. 455-82; 1978) 
 
Maung Aung Myoe - ‘The Organisational Development of the Burmese Army’ (ANU Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre, Working Paper 327; November 1998) 
Maung Aung Myoe - ‘Military Doctrine and Strategy in Myanmar: A Historical Perspective’ (ANU 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Working Paper 339; 1999) 
 
McLean, Ian (ed.) - ‘The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics’ (Oxford University Press 1996) 
 
Mon National Education Committee - ‘Statistics of Schools and Teachers (2002-03)’ (2002) 
 
The New Light of Myanmar (state-controlled newspaper) 
 
New Mon State Party - ‘Fundamental Political Policy and Fundamental Constitution of 
Administration’ (Department of Party Procedure 15-12-94; unofficial translation from Mon 
language document)  
New Mon State Party - ‘NBC News Interview’ (1967; reprinted Mon National University 1985) 
New Mon State Party - ‘Mon Revolution Day Statement’ (23-8-2002) 
 
Pederson, M., Rudland, E. and May, R. (eds) - ‘Burma-Myanmar: Strong Regime, Weak State?’ 
(Hurst 2000) 
 
Rotberg, R.I. (ed.) - ‘Burma: Prospects For a Democratic Future’ (World Peace Foundation 
1998) 
 
Sachsenroder, W. and Frings, U. - ‘Political Party Systems and Democratic Development in 
East and Southeast Asia; Volume 1: Southeast Asia’ (Ashgate 1998)  
 
SarDesai, D.R. - Southeast Asia: Past and Present (Westview 1994; third edition) 
 
Selth, Andrew - ‘The Burmese Armed Forces Next Century: Continuity or Change?’ (ANU 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Working Paper 338; September 1999) 
 
Smith, Anthony - ‘The Ethnic Origin of Nations’ (Blackwell 1988) 
 
Smith, Martin - ‘Burma (Myanmar): The Time For Change’ (Minority Rights Group 2002) 
 
South, Ashley - ‘Mon Nationalism and Civil War in Burma: The Golden Sheldrake’ 
(RoutledgeCurzon 2003) 
South, Ashley - ‘Political Transition in Myanmar: A New Model for Democratisation’, in 
Contemporary Southeast Asia (ISEAS, National University of Singapore), Vol. 26, No. 2 
(August 2004). 
 
Steinberg, David - ‘Burma: The State of Myanmar’ (Georgetown University Press 2002) 




Taylor, Robert - ‘Perceptions of Ethnicity in the Politics of Burma’ (Southeast Asian Journal of 
Social Science, Vol. 10, No. 1; 1982) 
Taylor, Robert - 'The State in Burma' (Hurst 1987) 
 
Thant Myint-U – ‘The Making of Modern Burma’ (Hurst 2001) 
 
Thein Lwin, ‘The Teaching of Ethnic Language and the Role of Education in the Context of Mon 
Ethnic Nationality in Burma - Initial Report of the First Phase of the Study on the Thai-Burma 
Border (November 1999-February 2000)’ (mss 3-3-2000) 
 
Tonnesson, Stein and Antlov, Hans (eds) - ‘Asian Forms of the Nation’ (Curzon Press 1996) 
 
Tun Thein - ‘Mon Political History’ (Mon Unity League, Bangkok 1999; unofficial translation from 
the Burmese) 
 
